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NOTES
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION - WHEN RESIDENCE
DEEMED "INCOME-PRODUCING" PROPERTY
When a taxpayer abandons his residence as such, the character
of the property thereafter has a particular significance in regard to
the owner's income taxes. That this is so is illustrated by two ex-
amples: First, if the residence takes on the character of "income-
producing" property, and the property is subsequently sold at a loss,
the taxpayer will find that he is entitled to a deduction for the loss
sustained on the sale (limited, however, in that the basis of the
property is computed with reference to its value at the time of its
change in character if such value happens to be less than the cost
of the property.)' Secondly, if it can be said that the residence has
been converted into "property held for the production of income,"
the taxpayer is entitled to deductions for depreciation2 and mainte-
nance expenses3 thereof. The material questions in either case are
always whether or not a change in character has taken place, and if
so, when?
The discussion to follow deals with the following set of circum-
stances: The taxpayer abandoned his old residence and listed it
with a real estate broker "for rent" or "for rent or sale." Efforts
to rent the property were unsuccessful, and the property was even-
tually sold at a price less than its value at the time of its abandonment.
Is the taxpayer entitled to take deductions for depreciation and main-
tenance expenses of the property for the interim before it was sold?
Is he entitled to deduct the loss on the sale? The answer turns on
the character assumed by the property at the time it was abandoned
and listed.
In the set of circumstances set out above, it happens that the de-
predation and maintenance expenses are deductible whereas the loss
is not.4 This is a confusing point in our federal income tax law. It
seems that in determining whether or not a change in character has
taken place, separate thought patterns are followed in cases involv-
ing the deductibility of a loss and cases involving the deductibility of
depreciation and maintenance expenses. The property is said to be
1. U. S. TRIAS. REG. 118, § 39.23 (e)-1(e) (1953).
2. IRC § 23 (a) (2).
3. IRC § 23 (1) (2).
4. William C. Horrmann, 17 T. C. 903 (1951); Mary Laughlin Robinson,
2 T. C. 305 (1943).
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"property held for the production of income," thus making it pos-
sible to deduct depreciation and maintenance expenses, yet it is not
regarded as "income-producing" property, and a loss is therefore
not deductible.
It is the purpose of this discussion to explain in some way the
reasons underlying the different treatment of these two types of
deductions. To reduce verbiage, the cases dealing with the deduc-
tibility of a loss under the circumstances set out above will be re-
ferred to as the loss cases. Those dealing with the deductibility of
depreciation and maintenance expenses will be referred to as the
expense cases.
The Loss Cases
The authority for deducting maintenance expenses and deprecia-
tion is derived from the Internal Revenue Code itself as amended
in 1942,5 while the authority for determining whether or not a loss
is deductible stems from the language used in the Regulations. 6 Al-
though the Regulations do not have the same weight as statutory
enactment, this particular regulation has come to have peculiar force
and effect in a manner somewhat as follows:
Prior to 1928, a taxpayer could not deduct a loss resulting from
the sale of residence property unless the property was purchased or
constructed with a view to its subsequent sale at a profit. Thus, if
a taxpayer purchased or constructed residence property with the in-
tention of occupying it as his home, it was immaterial that he later
leased the property commercially; he was not allowed to deduct a
loss resulting from a subsequent sale of the property. The Supreme
Court, however, in Heiner v. Tindle,7 held that the abandonment of
a residence and the subsequent leasing of the property was equiva-
lent to purchasing or constructing commercial property with an origi-
nal purpose to lease it. Hence, a loss on the subsequent sale of such
is deductible by the same authority that allows a loss on the sale
of property acquired with an original purpose of producing income,
(but the basis of the property must be computed with reference to,
its value at the time of its change in character, if that value is less
than cost.8) Pursuant to this decision, the Treasury Department re-
vised its Regulations to the effect that although a loss on the sale
5. MAINTEXANcM ExrMNsFs: IRC § 23(a) (2); DEPRECIATION: IRC § 23
6. T-1. S. TREAS. Rico. 118, § 39.23(e)-i(e) (1953).
7. 276 U. S. 582, 48 S. Ct. 326, 72 L.Ed. 714, 6 AFTR 7366, 1 USTC IT 299,
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of residence property is not deductible where it is so used by the
taxpayer up to the time of its sale, if the property is rented or other-
wise appropriated to income-producing purposes prior to its sale,
then a loss is deductible, but it must not exceed the excess of the
value of the property at the time it was so appropriated.9 (Italics
added.)
A number of cases followed in which the property was never ac-
tually rented though efforts had been made to do so. The Courts,
using the test laid down in the new regulations, held that the property
cannot be deemed to have been "appropriated to income-producing
purposes" unless it was in fact rented or some other more positive
act of appropriation had taken place. The mere listing "for rent"
or "for rent or sale" was insufficient to constitute an "appropriation"
in the sense employed in the regulations.10
These cases consistently referred to the language of the regula-
tions thus giving it "Court sanction." In addition, Congress con-
tinued to reinact the same law without change year after year. Thus,
this regulation also required "statutory sanction".1
The Expense Cases
Prior to 1942, deductions for depreciation were allowable only on
business property. Property which produced income but which was
not a part of the taxpayer's regular trade or business could not be
depreciated. The same was true as to maintenance expenses. Thus,
if the taxpayer derived income from non-business property, his in-
come therefrom was fully taxable, yet he was not allowed to claim
deductions or depreciation and maintenance expenses. Why? Be-
9. U. S. TxAs. RP4. 118, § 39.23(e)-1(e) (1953).
10. The leading cases are: Phipps v. Helvering, 124 F. 2d 292, 139
A.L.R. 809, 28 AFTR 635, 41-2 USTC T 9787 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Gevirtz v.
Commissioner, 123 F. 2d 707, 28 AFTR 402, 41-2 USTC ir 9760 (2d Cir.
1941); Schmidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d 680, 118 A.L.R. 297, 21 AFTR
175, 38-1 USTC 1 9285 (3d Cir. 1938); Rumsey v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d
158, 17 AFTR 557, 36-1 USTC ff 9157 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S.
552, 57 S. Ct. 14, 81 L.Ed. 406 (1936); Morgan v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d
390, 15 AFTR 1130, 35-1 USTC ff 9243 (5th Cir. (1935) ), cert. denied, 296
U. S. 601, 56 S. Ct. 117, 80 L.Ed. 426 (1935). These cases and others de-
cided by the Board of Tax Appeals are discussed in an annotation at 139 A.L.R.
815. For more recent cases of the Tax Court level, see Rowena S. Barnum,
19 T.C. 401 (1952); E. R. Fenimore Johnson, 19 T.C. 93 (1952); William C.
Horrmann, 17 T.C. 903 (1951); Allen L. Grammer, 12 T.C. 34 (1949); Rea E.
Warner, 1947 (P.-H.) Memo. Dec. 1 47,144, 6 TCM 582 (memo. op.), CCH
Dec. 15,822 (m) (1947), affmd. per curiar, 167 F. 2d 633, 36 AFTR 973, 48-1
USTC ir 9250 (2d Cir. 1948).
11. Allen L. Grammer, 12 T.C. 34 (1949).
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cause Congress had not authorized such deductions. Simply, there
was an absence of authority permitting them.12
Congress supplied this authority in the Revenue Act of 1942.13
By that Act, it was provided that a taxpayer may claim deductions
for both depreciation and maintenance expenses on "property held
for the production of income".
This similarity in language with the regulations so often cited by
the Courts in disposing of loss cases would seem to indicate that the
"property" referred to in the regulations and the "property" re-
ferred to in the new legislation would be the same type of proper-
ty. Certainly, at first blush, it would seem that "income-produc-
ing property" and "property held for the production of income"
are one and the same thing. If so, it would follow that depre-
ciation and maintenance expenses would be deductible only where
the property is of such character that a loss would also be deductible
if the property were sold at a loss. But this question remained to
be passed on by the Court.
At the time the 1942 Act was passed, the case of Robinson v. Com-
nmissioner14 was under review by the Third Circuit. Taxpayer had
abandoned his residence and had had it listed "for rent or sale,"
but was never successful in his efforts to rent the house. The Court
affirmed the holding below that deductions for depreciation and
maintenance expenses were not deductible as business expenses be-
cause the property had never been appropriated to a business use.
Leave was granted, however, for the Tax Court to reconsider the
case with regard to the applicability of the recent legislation, to wit:
whether or not the deductions were proper as related to "property
held for the production of income". On the second hearing,15 the
Tax Court concluded that the new law was applicable, and that the
taxpayer was entitled to the deductions claimed. The abandonment
of the residence and the undertaking to rent it, changed the character
of the property to "property held for the production of income," al-
though the property was never in fact rented. The Court acknowl-
edged that the character of the property had not changed in regard to
taking a loss deduction on a sale of it were it thereafter sold at a
loss, but justified its finding by reference to the intention of Congress
in enacting the new law. It was said that it was the intention of
Congress to benefit the taxpayer by allowing deductions where re-
12. Robinson v. Commissioner, 134 F. 2d 168, 30 AFTR 1047, 43-1 USTC
It 9279 (3d Cir. 1943).
13. § 121, Rrv. AcT or 1942.
14. 134 F. 2d 168, 30 AFTR 1047, 43-1 USTC 1 9279 (3d Cir. 1943).
15. Mary Laughlin Robinson, 2 T.C. 305 (1943).
[Vol. 6
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lated to property which constituted a potential source of taxable
income. "The statute does not require that the property be actually
used for production of income, that is, be actually rented, but only
held for that purpose . ..."16
Rea E. Warner17 raised the question as to whether these two posi-
tions were not inconsistent, i. e. Is it not inconsistent to allow de-
ductions for depredation and maintenance expenses on the theory
that the property is held for the production of income yet disallow
a loss upon the theory that the property is not income-producing
property? The Court said that such action is not inconsistent, cit-
ing the Robinson'8 case. The Court, in disallowing a loss, referred
to the language of the Code rather than that of the Regulations used
as the test in prior loss decisions. The Code employs the language,
".. . in any transaction entered into for profit".' 9 It seems the
Court was trying to avoid the confusion caused by the similarity be-
tween the language of the Regulations and that of the new amend-
ment.
In William C. Horrnann,20 there was a noticeable avoidance of
the language of the Regulations pertaining to losses. There, peti-
tioners sold their abandoned home at a loss after several unsuccess-
ful attempts to rent it. The Court allowed deductions for deprecia-
tion and maintenance expenses during the period of idleness, but
disallowed the loss. Pointing to the difference in the language of
the applicable Code sections, the Court said, ". .. that distinction in
language may result in allowing a deduction in one case and not
allowing a deduction of another type. At least the cases have dis-
tinguished between the two statutory provisions."''
Since the Horrmann decision, there seems to be no question but
what the law in these respects is well settled. In E. R. Fenimore
Jo}hnson,22 the Court, in disallowing a loss, devoted only a few lines
to say, "The fact that the petitioners have been allowed to deduct
depredation of the premises since 1940 is of no significance. De-
preciation is properly allowable where property is merely held for
the production of income even though in the taxable year it has
16. Id. at 309.
17. 1947 (P.H.) TC Memo. Dec. 1 47,144, 6 TCM 582 (memo. op.), CCH
Dec. 15,822(m) (1947), affmd. per curian, 167 F. 2d 633, 36 AFTR 973, 48-1
USTC 9250 (2d Cir. 1948).
18. Note 15, supra.
19. IRC § 23(e) (2).
20. 17 T.C. 903 (1951).
21. Id. at 909.
22. 19 T.C. 93 (1952).
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Even if not too sound in logic, the rules as they exist today cer-
tainly have their support in authority. It may have been that if
the first loss case had been decided after 1942, the Court would have
allowed the deduction for the sake of consistency, but as it happened,
in 1942, these cases had become too well settled to admit any change
in policy.
It does not seem necessary to decide whether these holdings are
consistent or inconsistent. The question is hardly worth arguing.
But even if the rules are inconsistent, it does not follow that the re-
sult is bad law. Since it appeared to the Court that Congress meant
to benefit the taxpayer by the provision allowing the new type of de-
ductions, and since there was nothing to indicate that Congress
meant to change the rule as had been long applied to cases involving
losses, the Court could not have put the two types of deductions on
the same basis without violating what it inferred to be the intention
of Congress.
ROBT. J. THOMAS.
23. Id. at 98.
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